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2 
 
 Counsel for Appellant Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. 
 
Marc H. Edelson 
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Edelson & Associates 
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_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________       
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent.  
   
SMITH, Chief Judge.
 Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Co. (“Allstate”) appeals a jury 
verdict in favor of homeowner Ahsaki Gordon on a breach of contract claim.  
Allstate’s appeal primarily concerns its claim that the District Court erred by 
allowing the jury to consider Gordon’s reasonable expectations of insurance 
coverage.  We conclude that any error was harmless, and will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.   
I. 
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 After a storm, on March 10 and 11, 2015, portions of the stone façade of 
Gordon’s home collapsed.  Allstate denied Gordon’s claim for coverage on the 
basis that her policy was limited to “sudden and accidental physical loss to the 
property” caused by a named peril, including windstorms.  J.A. 73a.  According to 
Allstate, the damage to Gordon’s home was caused by neglect, not the storm.   
 On June 3, 2015, Gordon filed a one-count breach of contract complaint in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The 
Philadelphia Housing Finance Agency (“PHFA”), Gordon’s mortgagee, was joined 
as a plaintiff.  After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Gordon, finding 
that she and PHFA “proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the collapse of 
the exterior wall . . . was a sudden and accidental physical loss caused by a 
windstorm as covered under her policy with defendant.”  J.A. 724a.  The jury 
awarded Gordon $177,684.74, and the District Court entered judgment 
accordingly.  After Allstate moved for, and was denied, judgment as a matter of 
law and a new trial, Allstate timely filed this appeal.1 
II. 
 At trial, Allstate filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent Gordon from 
testifying about her reasonable expectations of coverage.  The District Court 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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denied Allstate’s motion, permitted the testimony, and later provided instructions 
to the jury concerning that testimony.2  Allstate claims that the District Court erred 
in doing so, contending there was no basis for permitting the jury to consider 
testimony regarding Gordon’s reasonable expectations of coverage.3   
 Even if Allstate could demonstrate that Gordon’s testimony should have 
been excluded as a matter of Pennsylvania law,4 “errors in the admission or 
                                                 
2 Gordon testified that, when she purchased her home, she had the following 
conversation with an insurance agent: “When he asked me, you know, what kind of 
– type of insurance do I want, I said I don’t know. You tell me what type of 
insurance I should get. It’s a 100 something years old. The house is old. I don’t 
have any money . . . so tell me what is – what policy that I can get that can fix it if 
anything goes wrong.  I don’t know anything about houses, so I won’t – I don’t 
know what to ask you . . . you’re the professional, you tell me what you think I 
should’ve based on everything I told you about the house? And he said oh, I have a 
policy great for you.”  J.A. 265a–66a.  When asked, “what were your concerns 
specifically when you’re talking to the agent about you wanted to buy a policy?,” 
Gordon responded, “[t]hat I wanted to be covered.”  J.A. 267a. 
  
3 We review both the District Court’s evidentiary ruling and its decision regarding 
the jury instructions for abuse of discretion.  Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 
1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) (evidentiary rulings); Fahie v. Virgin Islands, 858 F.3d 
162, 169 (3d Cir. 2017) (jury instructions).  
4 Pennsylvania law is not entirely clear as to the circumstances under which an 
insured’s reasonable expectations of coverage are to be considered.  Compare 
Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 567 (Pa. 1983) 
(“[W]here, as here, the policy limitation relied upon by the insurer to deny 
coverage is clearly worded and conspicuously displayed, the insured may not avoid 
the consequences of that limitation by proof that he failed to read the limitation or 
that he did not understand it.”), with Tonkovic v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
521 A.2d 920, 926 (Pa. 1987) (“The reasonable expectation of the insured is the 
focal point of the insurance transaction . . . .  Thus, regardless of the ambiguity, or 
lack thereof, inherent in a given set of insurance documents . . ., the public has a 
right to expect that they will receive something of comparable value in return for 
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exclusion of evidence cannot be grounds for reversal or a new trial if they 
constitute harmless error.”  Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1213 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 61).  
An error is harmless when there is a “high probability” that the discretionary error 
did not contribute to the verdict.  Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 832 F.3d 
170, 196 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).   
 Here, any error would be harmless because Gordon presented sufficient 
evidence to support the jury’s determination that the collapse of Gordon’s home 
was a “sudden and accidental physical loss caused by a windstorm as covered 
under her policy with defendant.”  J.A. 724a.  For instance, Gordon presented 
expert testimony from an engineer who opined that the collapse was a sudden, 
catastrophic event and that “the wind damage [wa]s the final nail in the coffin that 
cause[d] the collapse of this. . . .  [He] would attribute this [collapse] more to a 
wind event . . . .”  J.A. 475a–76a.  Gordon also presented testimony from the 
contractor who repaired her home, who personally observed that “there was 
damage by the scupper box along the fascia board which in [his] assessment had 
blown off and turned into a catch funnel.”  J.A. 337a.   
                                                                                                                                                             
the premium paid.” (quoting Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 
1353 (Pa. 1978))); see also Bensalem Twp. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 
1303, 1311 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Faced with Collister, Standard Venetian Blind, and 
Tonkovic, we are unable to draw any categorical distinction between the types of 
cases in which Pennsylvania courts will allow the reasonable expectations of the 
insured to defeat the unambiguous language of an insurance policy and those in 
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 Because Gordon presented ample evidence to support the determination that 
the loss was caused by a windstorm—and therefore was covered by the express 
terms of the contract—it is highly probable that the jury would have reached that 
same result even without Gordon’s reasonable expectations testimony.  Any 
claimed error in admitting Gordon’s reasonable expectations of coverage—and any 
related error in instructing the jury regarding that evidence—was therefore 
harmless.5  E.g., Hill v. Reederei F. Laeisz G.M.B.H., Rostock, 435 F.3d 404, 411 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“An error will be deemed harmless only if it is ‘highly probable’ 
that the error did not affect the outcome of the case.” (quoting Forrest v. Beloit 
Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir. 2005))). 
III. 
 Allstate also contends that the District Court erred in denying its motion for 
judgment as a matter of law because, according to Allstate, the evidence presented 
at trial demonstrated that the “predominant cause” of the damage to Gordon’s 
home was a lack of maintenance, and the loss was therefore not covered by the 
                                                                                                                                                             
which the courts will follow the general rule of adhering to the precise terms of the 
policy.”). 
5 Allstate further contends that the jury instructions regarding reasonable 
expectations were “mutually exclusive and inconsistent.”  We have reviewed the 
instructions and conclude that they accurately apprised the jury of the applicable 
law.  See Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 78 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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policy.  The District Court denied Allstate’s motion at trial, as well as its renewed 
post-trial motion.6    
 A motion for judgment as a matter of law “should be granted only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the 
advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence 
from which a jury reasonably could find liability.”  Avaya Inc. v. Telecom Labs, 
Inc., 838 F.3d 354, 373 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993)).  Such a motion should be granted only 
sparingly.  Goodman v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 665 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 As already discussed, we are satisfied that the jury’s verdict rested upon 
sufficient evidence of liability.  Accordingly, the District Court properly denied 
Allstate’s motion. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                 
6 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s denial of judgment as a 
matter of law.  See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 433 (3d Cir. 2009).  
